

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 077 103

EA 005 004

AUTHOR Cistone, Peter J.  
TITLE School Board Member Recruitment in Ontario.  
PUB DATE Feb 73  
NOTE 26p.; Paper presented at American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting (58th, New Orleans, Louisiana, February 25-March 1, 1973)  
  
EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.65 HC-\$3.29  
DESCRIPTORS \*Board Candidates; Board of Education Role; \*Boards of Education; Leadership Qualities; Leadership Styles; Models; Personnel Selection; \*Political Influences; \*Recruitment; \*Socioeconomic Influences; Speeches  
  
IDENTIFIERS Elitism; Ontario

ABSTRACT

Employing a process model of political recruitment, this study investigated the relative impact of a school district's social, economic, and political structure on school board member recruitment. The process data were collected by means of structured interviews with neophyte school board members in a stratified sample of school boards in the Province of Ontario. Structural data were drawn from government documents and records and from reports of political party officials. Results of the study indicate that the social, economic, and political structure of school districts was a determining factor in school board member recruitment patterns.  
(Author)

MAR 30 1973

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ED 077103

SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER RECRUITMENT IN ONTARIO

Peter J. Cistone  
Assistant Professor of Educational Administration  
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

A paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the  
American Educational Research Association  
New Orleans, February 25-March 1, 1973

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## SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER RECRUITMENT IN ONTARIO\*

In any political system, the few are chosen to govern the many. As Lord Bryce observed:

In all assemblies and groups and organized bodies of men, from a nation down to a committee of a club, direction and decisions rest in the hands of a small percentage, less and less in proportion to the larger size of the body, till in a great population it becomes an infinitesimally small proportion of the whole number. This is and always has been true of all forms of government, though in different degrees.<sup>1</sup>

The axiom articulated by Bryce has had a long history in political analysis. From Plato to the present,<sup>2</sup> students of politics have exhibited an abiding interest in the process of elite recruitment, representation, and behavior. Although political theories express divergent conceptions of the political system and of its structure and processes, all theories share a common emphasis on the critical importance of elite recruitment in the maintenance and viability of the political system. The axiom that the few are chosen to govern the many is explicit in theoretical works as disparate as those of Lasswell, Machiavelli, Marx, Mosca, and Pareto.

Elite recruitment -- or political recruitment as it is more commonly termed -- refers to the process that selects (or allocates) individuals for specific political roles. "The political recruitment function," wrote Almond and Coleman, "takes up where the general political socialization function leaves off. It recruits members of the particular subcultures -- religious communities, statuses, classes, ethnic communities and the like, and inducts them into the specialized roles of the political system."<sup>3</sup> As such, political recruitment is a central function of the system; for if

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\* The research project of which this analysis is a part is funded by a grant from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education and its Department of Educational Administration.

the political system is to persist over time, institutionalized means must exist to ensure a constant flow of personnel into political roles to replace those who die, retire, or fail to retain office. Without the constant renewal of elites, the political system would lose its capacity to adapt and respond and cope with its problems.

Most political systems institutionalize two principal methods of recruitment: election and appointment. The flow of personnel into the polity occurs by means of formal election, bureaucratic appointment and ascent, or some combination of election and appointment. In effect, institutionalized recruitment provides and regulates the supply of role aspirants by specifying the qualifications and criteria of selection, defining the stages of the selection process, and determining the rewards and costs of the pursuit of political office. Institutionalization of the recruitment process stabilizes it and makes it predictable; this allows role aspirants to plan and to acquire resources, and allows as well for their training and preparation for entry into the specific role.<sup>4</sup>

For role aspirants, recruitment encompasses two processes: 1) transformation from non-political roles to eligibility for political roles, and 2) the selection and assignment of individuals to specific political roles.<sup>5</sup> Seen in this way, political recruitment is a selective flow of individuals that entails both eligibility for elite status and subsequent selection and assignment to specific elite positions. It should be noted that the recruitment process adheres to the predominant values in a given system. In "traditional" systems, for instance, ascriptive kinship determines eligibility and family succession determines role selection. Modern democracies, on the other hand, are systems in which popular elections

are typically associated with wider eligibility for role selection. The critical point is that recruitment is a systemic property, a part of the political matrix of the larger system. And so Seligman stated:

As a dependent variable, elite recruitment expresses...the value system, the types of representation, and the articulation of social stratification with the political status system. As a factor that effects change, the pattern of elite recruitment defines avenues for political activity and status. These paths to political positions influence the distribution of status and prestige, as well as economic and political policies.<sup>6</sup>

The systematic investigation of the recruitment phenomenon has produced an extensive body of knowledge on leadership selection. Included therein are elite theories and studies,<sup>7</sup> sociological and career-ladder studies,<sup>8</sup> and psychological studies.<sup>9</sup>

Empirical research into the process of political leadership recruitment has gained increasing currency since World War II,<sup>10</sup> with particular emphasis on those who occupy formal positions of authority within the political system (i.e., legislators and political party activists). Generally, such studies have been devoted to investigating who the leaders are,<sup>11</sup> how and why they are where they are,<sup>12</sup> and what variables have affected their individual political careers.<sup>13</sup> The cumulative result of these and other investigations is that much is known about the structure and distribution of power and influence in several different societies; about the salient attributes and characteristics of the incumbents of various political roles; about the social, economic, and ideological composition of leadership strata; and about the dynamic interaction between political leaders and their publics.

However, much less is known about the political recruitment process itself, the process of leadership selection. The research stimulated by

elite theories, for instance, has identified political elites and revealed the effect of the socioeconomic background of political leaders on public policy; but such research provides little documentation of the process whereby some are selected for elite status in political life and others are not. While social background studies are important in their own right, they tend to illuminate only one segment of the recruitment process. Likewise, election studies are informative about the election ceremony and the ratification of certain candidates for public office; yet they typically neglect the very processes that identify, screen, select, and elevate individuals to candidacy in the first place.

A potentially more fruitful line of inquiry into the process of political recruitment is currently emerging in the social sciences.<sup>14</sup> It is one that shifts attention away from the individual political career and directs it to the social and political processes whereby political communities select their elected public officials. Political recruitment is seen not as something that happens to an individual so much as something that happens to a leadership group. A more integrated approach to the recruitment phenomenon than any of those typically employed, it conceptualizes the recruitment process as a series of individual experiences and social processes that interactively and successively narrow the population of a political community to the few who hold formal, elected political office and exercise political authority.

It was from this perspective that we investigated the recruitment of one circle of local political elites - school board members. It is this elite corps of citizens that authoritatively allocates values in the formulation and implementation of public policy for education. Despite


the ramifying effects of the recruitment phenomenon on the policy orientations of school board members, only a few pieces of research bear on the question of school board member recruitment.<sup>15</sup> In the analysis that is reported here, attention was directed to some of the individual experiences and social processes through which selected communities in the province of Ontario choose, from among their populations, the very few citizens -- a small fraction of the total number -- who will occupy seats on the school board.

#### Analytic Framework

The analytic framework employed in our study of school board member recruitment in Ontario was conceived and developed by Kenneth Prewitt and applied in his research on the recruitment of city councilmen (as part of the City Council Research Project sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University).<sup>16</sup> The process whereby the few come to govern the many is represented by a simple diagram. A large box represents the population that is governed and from which come those who govern; a much smaller box, placed inside the larger one, represents the few who are selected to govern (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1

#### THE GOVERNED AND THE GOVERNORS



However, such a representation is too simplistic. A more complex representation is suggested by the Chinese Box Puzzle. In this puzzle, a series of different-sized boxes is designed so that the smallest box fits into the next larger one, that one into the next larger one, and so on. The largest box contains all the smaller ones. The next largest box is contained by the larger one and in turn contains all of the smaller ones. In the puzzle, the smallest box is not reached until one has uncovered, so to speak, all the intermediate boxes between the largest (and least exclusive) and the smallest (and most exclusive) box.

The Chinese Box Puzzle, Prewitt reasons, suggests an approach to the study of political recruitment. There is the gradual and continuous process of selection and elimination that narrows the population of a political community to the very few who hold office. Every political community has a relatively large number of citizens who meet the minimal legal requirements for holding office. In the next largest box are those citizens who are attuned to political matters -- the politically attentive public. From this public come another and yet smaller group that is politically active. And from this group comes an even smaller number of citizens who are actually recruited into those channels that lead to political candidacy. And from those are chosen the candidates, and from the candidates are chosen the few who govern. As the few approach leadership positions, they are successively placed in smaller and smaller boxes.

Accordingly, Prewitt asserts, leadership selection refers to those individuals and institutional factors that successively establish entry into each smaller box. Informed and guided by Prewitt's work, we report here findings that were generated by tracing the collective political

careers of school board members in a sample of Ontario communities.<sup>17</sup>

Figure 2 presents a version of the Chinese Box Puzzle translated into a statement on the recruitment of Ontario school board members. Between the largest box and the smallest box are intermediate boxes, which identify social and political processes that successively narrow the population. Figure 2 is both a schematic presentation of the framework and an outline of our presentation of findings.


### Procedures

Data for the study were collected on two major sets of variables: the process of recruitment and the structural parameters of recruitment. The sources of data and the methods of collection differed for each major set of variables.

The process data were generated by means of structured interviews with school board members in a stratified random sample of thirty public school systems in the province of Ontario. To obtain the sample, all public school systems in the province were categorized on the basis of five geographical areas in order to eliminate geographical bias in the selection of the sample. Three stratification criteria were used in drawing subsamples from each of the geographical areas: 1) the population of the school system, 2) the level of urbanization of the school system, and 3) the level of inter-party political competition. Two school board members in each of the thirty selected school systems were interviewed, typically the most experienced and least experienced in terms of school board service. These sixty school board members constituted the sample for the study.

The interviews were conducted over a two-year period. Each school

FIGURE 2  
CHINESE BOX PUZZLE



board member was interviewed individually, and interviews normally ran for a period of roughly seventy-five minutes. The interview schedule was extensive and ranged over a wide variety of topics related to the process of school board member recruitment. Most of the respondents were interviewed in their home communities -- in their home, place of business, or school system office. Some were interviewed at regional or provincial school board meetings and conferences.

The structural data were collected from a variety of sources and provided a bank of information on the social, economic, and political characteristics of school systems in Ontario. Particularly useful were federal and provincial government documents relating to measures of urbanization, industrialization, racial and ethnic distributions, and the like. Information on school system characteristics, voter registration, election results, inter-party political competition, and so on was available from provincial, educational, and municipal offices and officials.

The analytic framework employed in this study required two strategies of inquiry: first, it was necessary to consider both institutional and individual aspects of leadership selection; second, it was necessary to concentrate on the central tendencies in the data rather than explore the variations.<sup>18</sup> The institutional variables include 1) the legal parameters that affect movement into and out of political office, and 2) the more or less institutionalized agencies that screen and select aspirants for political office, and the criteria they employ. The individual variables include those normally associated with political career analysis: socioeconomic background, socialization and recruitment experiences, and the like. Analysis is restricted to the central tendencies in the data and to investigation of

the modalities rather than the dispersion around the central tendencies.

### Findings

The paradigm of the Chinese Box Puzzle served as the analytic framework for the study of school board member recruitment. It directed attention to the process of selection and elimination that narrows the population of a school system to the very few who hold seats on the school board. As previously explicated, between the largest box -- the many who are governed -- and the smallest box -- the few who govern -- are intermediate boxes that identify social and political processes that successively narrow the population.

The approach to the study, then, was to trace the collective political careers of the Ontario school board members in our sample through successive stages of selection. It is to the empirical description of the stages of the recruitment process that we now turn.

### The Legally Qualified

Under the British North America Act of 1867, each province in Canada retains the right to organize and administer the schools within its boundaries. Accordingly, the provincial legislature has plenary power with respect to matters of educational policy.

The formal, legal requirements and qualifications for school board membership are therefore prescribed in the legislative statutes of each province. The various statutes pertaining to the administration of education in Ontario clearly and sharply circumscribe the potential pool of school board members. Currently, the only persons legally qualified to be elected to public school boards are those who are: 1) Canadian citizens, 2) of the

full age of eighteen years, 3) residents in or within one mile of the school section, and 4) ratepayers in the school section.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, the statutes specify seven classes of persons who are not legally qualified to be elected, even though they satisfy the four basic requirements. For instance, a person is not qualified to be elected who is a member of any other school board, who is a member of the council of a municipality or county in which all or part of the school section is situated, or who is the husband or wife of a school board member of the same board. Obviously, by establishing ascriptive and achieved criteria for holding office, the legal code substantially reduces the number of persons who might seek election.

There are still other ways whereby the legal code affects the selection process. Among other things, the statutes establish the number of members that may constitute a school board, specify the method of election and terms of office of school board members, and define their duties, responsibilities, and powers. In doing so, the legal code affects both selection and self-selection patterns. Persons eliminate themselves from the selection process because they perceive themselves as lacking the skill, stature, or motivation presumably appropriate to the office. Others advance their candidacy because of the perceived rewards of the office, or for any number of other reasons. Community norms and expectations held for school board members, which are at least partially formed on the basis of the power and authority legally vested in the school board, also shape the recruitment process in that they influence perceptions regarding who is seen as qualified.

Consequently, the legal code affects the recruitment process both directly and indirectly. By establishing legal criteria, it formally restricts the opportunity to seek office to those who satisfy the legal

requirements. By influencing community norms and expectations, it also serves to reinforce informal opportunity structures that are more restrictive than the formal ones. The legal code thus greatly reduces the number of persons in the community who might hold school board office.

### The Socially Eligible

It is an article of faith in the traditional democratic creed that there should be equality of opportunity for all to influence public policy. "The keynote of democracy," John Dewey wrote, "may be expressed as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living of men together."<sup>20</sup> Embedded in the creed is the principle that every legally qualified citizen has an equal chance at winning election to public office and occupying a political position.

Despite the normative prescription, virtually all major policy decisions in contemporary democratic communities are the result of the efforts of various elites rather than the combined efforts of the citizenry at large.<sup>21</sup> Elected officials and political leaders do not in fact represent a random sample of the population from which they are chosen. Rather, they are selected from socially more favored groups. The electorate chooses not from all of its members who are legally qualified to hold office, but from a pool of eligibles who are disproportionately drawn from the higher social-status groups in the community. "Stratification analysis," Matthews concluded, "suggests the probability that the political life-chances of those with high social status will be considerably better than those with average or low prestige."<sup>22</sup> In his analysis of social class and power in Canada, The Vertical Mosaic, Porter<sup>23</sup> confirmed the stratification hypothesis.

School board members in Ontario are likewise drawn from upper socio-economic strata. Table 1 presents information on the school board members in our sample. It is clearly evident that they are not chosen in proportionate numbers from all population groupings and are not representative of the population at large. For instance, although only about half of the population in our sample of school systems were engaged in white-collar occupations, nearly nine-tenths of the school board members were so engaged. When their occupations are measured on the Blishen Socio-Economic Index for Occupations in Canada,<sup>24</sup> nearly all rank among the top half of society's occupations. Whereas the median family income for the population is \$7,880, the median for school board members is \$14,340. Furthermore, although fewer than a quarter of the households in the population have incomes in excess of \$10,000, more than three-quarters of the school board members come from that group. While 38 percent of the population have at least some post-secondary education, 76 percent of the school board members have at least some post-secondary education and 64 percent of them hold at least one higher education degree.

It is obvious from the data presented in the table that the social and economic composition of school boards, at least of those in our sample, is a distortion of the populations they are intended to serve. School board members come disproportionately from the upper social-status groups. Demographic malrepresentation is a persistent and pervasive feature of educational governance in Ontario.

Socioeconomic considerations, therefore, serve to structure the recruitment process whereby the many are narrowed to the few. The socioeconomic bias at

TABLE 1  
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS  
AND POPULATION IN SAMELE SCHOOL SYSTEMS

| Characteristic                   | Population<br>% | School Board Members<br>(N=60)<br>% |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|
| Occupation                       |                 |                                     |
| White-Collar                     | 49              | 89                                  |
| Family Income                    |                 |                                     |
| Less than \$5,000                | 7               | 0                                   |
| \$5,000 - \$10,000               | 71              | 22                                  |
| More than \$10,000               | 22              | 78                                  |
| Education                        |                 |                                     |
| Some Post-Secondary<br>Education | 38              | 76                                  |

work in the school board member recruitment process sharply reduces the number of legally qualified citizens who might hold office. In terms of our framework, socioeconomic qualifications for the school board office reduce by roughly 75 percent the number of people who can reasonably expect to serve.

#### The Politically Active

High social status alone does not ensure recruitment to political elite status. Even though the upper-status strata of society are overrepresented in leadership positions, only a few members of such strata become office-holders. If the eligibles are those who have the requisite social and economic traits, the number of eligibles is still far greater than the number who are actively

interested in educational affairs, and greater again than the number who consider seeking election to the school board. Factors other than the legal code and social stratification operate to further reduce the pool of citizens who might stand for office.

The formation of the active stratum is determined by social and political processes. It is these processes that sort from among the socially eligible those who are likely to become part of the active stratum.

In our sample 93 percent indicated that they had reached the threshold of activity in educational affairs as a result of primary group influence. Evidently, having parents, relatives, or close friends in education facilitated their awareness of and familiarity with educational issues. The great majority (84 percent) reported having relatives or close friends who were school teachers or administrators, and 22 percent reported having relatives who were school board members.

More important, 19 percent had themselves held positions in education at one time or another. Of this total, 54 percent had been in the education profession for five years or more; 47 percent had worked in the same school system where they later became school board members; and 9 percent were currently employed in education. It may be reasonably inferred that their occupational involvement was a compelling factor in ushering them to the threshold of the active stratum.

Of the school board members in our sample, then, over nine-tenths began their movement to the active stratum long before the public could influence their decision to be active. As a result of their experiences in immediate social environments, they were on the road to school board membership well in advance of recognition or ratification by screening or selecting agencies.

Initial entry into the active stratum, as distinct from movement toward the threshold of activity, took for the form of active involvement in the organizational and associational life of the community. Virtually every school board member in our sample (97 percent) indicated that he had been active in some civic, educational, or occupational organization prior to seeking election to the board. In sharp contrast, interestingly enough, partisan political activity had ushered into the active stratum only 3 percent of the sample. It would seem that the nonpartisan system of Ontario's municipal elections affects the circumstances under which a person is likely to become active as well as the route to be taken to office. In any case, community organizations and associations of the kind noted seem to serve as breeding grounds for future school board members and staging areas for candidacy.

Activity in such subsystems of the community is manifestly an important variable in determining who belongs to the active stratum. Candidates for the school board are drawn from this stratum and become the recruits in the selection process -- the minority within the active minority who actually become candidates.

### The Recruits

It is from within the active stratum that persons come who move into channels of elimination and selection that eventually lead to candidacy for the school board. These are the recruits. Of course, not all recruits become candidates, but most candidates are drawn from among the recruits. Both selection and self-selection criteria are at work to reduce the number of actives to a relatively smaller number of recruits.

Just as experiences in immediate social environments had a decisive

effect on the movement of persons in our sample to the threshold of the active stratum, so their candidacies were nurtured in and by primary groups -- in this case, primary recruitment groups. Table 2 indicates the strong primary-group influence in their decision to advance their candidacies; for instance, nearly one-half cite family and friends as the primary sources of instigation and encouragement.

TABLE 2  
PRIMARY SOURCES OF INSTIGATION FOR  
SCHOOL BOARD CANDIDACY

| Source                 | School Board Members<br>(N=60)<br>% |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Family and Friends     | 44                                  |
| School Board Members   | 27                                  |
| Community Influentials | 12                                  |
| School Personnel       | 3                                   |
| Others                 | 2                                   |
| Self-starters          | 12                                  |

Of singular significance is the frequency with which incumbent board members instigated the candidacies of others -- engaged in the act of sponsorship, as it were. Continuity of policy and practice is most effectively maintained if control can be exercised over successive recruits. "A procession of like-minded men through office," wrote Eulau, "is equally as effective in stabilizing policies as is low turnover."<sup>25</sup> A system of oligarchic self-perpetuation appears to be a characteristic feature of school board member recruitment in Ontario.

As previously noted, initial entry into the active stratum for school board members took the form of active involvement in the organizational and associational life of the community. Virtually everyone in our sample (97 percent) indicated that he had been active in some civic, educational, or occupational organization prior to seeking election to the board. In effect, activity of this kind represents an apprenticeship prior to candidacy during which potential aspirants demonstrate their capacity for leadership and selectors and selection agencies evaluate their skills and values. Accordingly, apprenticeship serves two functions: one for the individual and one for the system.

The recruitment of candidates is therefore a dynamic, ongoing process that transpires within the context of informal, interpersonal relationships as well as in organizational activity of an apprenticeship nature prior to candidacy. Ambition and anticipation are nurtured in primary groups, but recruitment is greatly influenced by the strategies of established leadership. While the members of the active stratum are largely self-selected, the recruits are not. Recruits for candidacy are those who survive the interactive processes of identification, screening, elimination, sponsorship, and selection that occur within the active stratum. It is this minority within an active minority that becomes the candidates.

#### The Candidates and Elections

Candidates for the school board in Ontario are those very few individuals who survive the recruitment process and are presented to the public for final sorting and screening. Elections ultimately choose from the contestants those who will sit on the school board.

School board candidates are an elite corps of citizens. They do not represent a random sample of the population by any means, but are selected from socially more favored groups. For this reason, the electorate chooses not from all of its members who are legally qualified, but from a pool of eligibles who have been drawn from the higher social-status groups in the community and who have undergone a series of individual experiences and social processes. Elections do not so much serve to "choose leaders" as to ratify some and reject others from the very few who are presented to the public after the recruitment process has determined who shall stand for election.

Our study of school board member recruitment revealed several noteworthy features of school board elections in Ontario. First, the electorate constitutes a very small constituency because voter turnout is very low. In other words, only a relatively few citizens express their preferences in school board elections. Averaged over the last three elections, fewer than one-third of the eligible voters in our sample of school systems cast ballots. Since these are plurality elections, low voter turnout effectively means that a very small number of citizens elect school board members. A reasonable speculation on the basis of this information is that school board members hardly need feel accountable to some amorphous electorate; instead, obligation is owed to the much narrower segment of the electorate that provided the necessary votes.

Secondly, fewer than one-quarter of the school board members sampled reported that the educational program of their school system was the focus of election debate. Fewer than one-fifth identified the policy-making process as a matter of concern. It was decisions and policies relating to finances and physical facilities that provided the issues. Some 55 percent of the

school board members perceived the voters as uninterested in discussing educational program and policy development, and 79 percent saw finance as the principal public concern. Given the single-issue focus of school board elections, the public is denied the periodic review of its elected school officials across a breadth of programmatic and policy questions.

Thirdly, incumbent school board members in Ontario are only infrequently defeated. Over the last three elections, for instance, fewer than one in four of all incumbents in the school system of our sample were defeated in their bid for reelection. Here again elections do not appear to ensure electoral accountability. The regular frequency with which school board members are returned to office, together with low voter turnout and plurality elections, renders school board elections ritualistic exercises in democratic politics.

The problem for representative democracy is apparent. School board members in Ontario communities constitute a cadre of local elites different in many respects from the rest of the population. One inevitable difference between elites and non-elites that is common to all democratic systems was highlighted by Eulau:

It is an error, I think, to assume that the "chosen" - whether elected or selected - are or can ever be "like" their choosers. The very fact of their having been elected or selected - having been "elevated" through some mechanism of choice from one position into another - makes the "chosen" fundamentally different from their choosers. Having been chosen, the representative has at least one attribute that differentiates him from the represented, no matter how similar, socially or psychologically, he may be in all other respects. Status differentiation, then, is a crucial property of any representational relationship.<sup>26</sup>

Although school board members are unlike and set apart from those they represent, the notion of democratic representation presumes that elections

are effective in holding the former accountable to the latter. Nevertheless, while school board elections in Ontario do legitimate the right of successful candidates to claim office, certain characteristic features of these elections seriously impede their capacity to ensure accountability.

### Implications

In this study, the Chinese Box Puzzle was used as a heuristic device to analyze the school board member recruitment process in Ontario. Attention was directed to some of those individual experiences and social processes that successively narrow the population of a school system to the very few persons who are elected to the school board. Analysis was restricted to the central tendencies in the data. This particular report did not advance specific hypotheses, but rather sought to trace the collective careers of sixty systems in the province and to draw implications from the model patterns.

The essential finding -- that the recruitment process propels into office school board members who are different in many respects from those whom they represent -- has important implications for educational governance. In their social and economic characteristics, in their extended interest and involvement in educational affairs and organizational activities in the community, and in their superior status as the elected, school board members are elevated (to use Eulau's term) above the general populace. Given their privileged station and their considerable power and influence, the extent to which their official performance is monitored and regulated by periodic review procedures is crucial to the notions of democratic representation and the school as a social institution.

Presumably, competition among elites and review by the citizenry is

provided by elections. In this way, the democratic thesis contends, elections hold elected officials accountable. But, as we have already shown, it is unlikely that school board member accountability is forced by electoral sanctions. And it may be persuasively argued that in the absence of meaningful electoral sanctions school board members are less likely to be attentive to public preferences or responsive to public pressures.

The recruitment process also serves to shape the policy orientations of school board members. As Seligman states:

Recruitment ... determines the skills and competence of the elites. The shifts in the talents of elites result in certain policy predispositions. Brokers do not handle well issues of ideological differences. Managers and technicians are equally averse to ideological treatment of issues. The biased perceptions that occupational training and education produce bear directly on perceptions of policies. Political skills are points of view, as well as techniques that are reflected in substantive policy.<sup>27</sup>

Thus the recruitment process filters a particular range of talent and ability into the school board. Some talents and abilities are included, others are not. In any case, this filtering affects individual perspectives and produces characteristic modes of dealing with problems.<sup>28</sup> And it is this vital relationship between recruitment and the modes and consequences of incumbent behavior that provides an important target for future research.

NOTES

<sup>1</sup>James Bryce, Modern Democracies (New York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 542.

<sup>2</sup>For representative classical statements on the role of elites in political affairs, see The Republic of Plato, trans by Francis MacDonald Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), Chps. V-XIV; The Politics of Aristotle, trans by Sir Ernest Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), Books III, IV, and V; John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government (New York: Dutton, 1951), pp. 257-381; and Thomas Jefferson, "The Meaning of Republican Government," in M. Rejai, ed., Democracy: The Contemporary Theories (New York: Atherton, 1967), 63-67.

For more recent representative work treating the same topic, see James David Barber, The Lawmakers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Alan Kornberg and Hal H. Winsborough, "The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons," American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), 1242-57; Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954); Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970); Lester G. Seligman, Political Recruitment (Boston: Little, Brown, forthcoming); Immanuel Wallerstein, "Elites in French-Speaking West Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, III (1965), 1-33; Michael R. King, "Legislative Recruitment in Oregon: Structure and Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1970); and Robert J. Williams, "Recruitment to the Ontario Legislature" (paper presented at the forty-third annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. John's, Nfld., June, 1971).

<sup>3</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

<sup>4</sup>King, "Legislative Recruitment."

<sup>5</sup>Lester G. Seligman, "Political Mobility and Economic Development," in Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, ed. by Neil J. Smelser and Seymour Martin Lipset (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), p. 333.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 344.

<sup>7</sup>See, for example, Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953) and C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). For an exposition of the theory of elitist democracy, see Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth, 1970).

<sup>8</sup>See, for example, Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers and Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

<sup>9</sup>See, for example, Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: Norton, 1948) where he advances the "power accentuation" hypothesis. He offers a modified statement in his "The Selective Effect of Personality on Political Participation," in Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality," ed. by Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954), pp. 197-225. Studies of this nature are reviewed in Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Socialization and Leadership Selection," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (September, 1965), 96-111.

<sup>10</sup>Dwaine Marvick, "Introduction: Political Decision-Makers in Contrasting Milieus," in Political Decision-Makers, ed. by Marvick, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), pp. 13-28.

<sup>11</sup>See, for example, Peter G. Richards, Honourable Members (London: Faber and Faber, 1959) and Allan Kornberg and Joel Smith, "Self-concepts of American and Canadian Party Officials," Polity, III (Fall, 1970), 70-99.

<sup>12</sup>See, for example, Heinz Eulau, "The Legislative Career," in The Legislative System, ed. by John C. Wahlke, et al. (New York: John Wiley and Son, 1962) and Lewis Bowman and G. R. Boyton, "Recruitment Patterns Among Local Party Officials: A Model and Some Preliminary Findings in Selected Locales," American Political Science Review, LX (September, 1966), 667-76.

<sup>13</sup>See, for example, V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1956) and Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics.

<sup>14</sup>Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders.

<sup>15</sup>See, for example, Peter J. Cistone, "Municipal Political Structure and Role Allocation in Educational Decision-Making: An Exploration of One Linkage," Urban Education, VI (July/October, 1971), 147-65; George S. Counts, The Social Composition of Boards of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927); Neal Gross, Who Runs Our Schools? (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958); Laurence Iannaccone and Frank W. Lutz, Politics, Power and Policy: The Governing of Local School Districts (Columbus, O.: Charles E. Merrill, 1970); M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler, "Avenues to the School Board and Political Competition" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, 1972).

<sup>16</sup>Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders.

<sup>17</sup>In his The Recruitment of Political Leaders, Prewitt focused on elected political elites in the United States. We found his framework both appropriate and useful in our study of Ontario school board members.

<sup>18</sup>Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, pp. 15-22.

- <sup>19</sup> Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1970, c. 3, as amended by 1971, c. 89.
- <sup>20</sup> John Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," School and Society, April 3, 1937, pp. 457-62.
- <sup>21</sup> See, for example, Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965) and Dye and Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy.
- <sup>22</sup> Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers, p. 9
- <sup>23</sup> John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).
- <sup>24</sup> Bernard R. Blishen, "A Socio-Economic Index for Occupations in Canada," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, IV (February, 1967), 41-53.
- <sup>25</sup> Heinz Eulau, Micro-Macro Political Analysis (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 316.
- <sup>26</sup> Heinz Eulau, "Changing Views of Representation," in Contemporary Political Science, ed. by Ithiel de Sola Pool (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967) p. 80.
- <sup>27</sup> Seligman, Political Recruitment.
- <sup>28</sup> Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, LVI (December, 1962), 947-52.